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ABSTRACT 
On December 8, 2007, the largest shipment of high-enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel was successfully made 
from a Russian-designed nuclear research reactor in the Czech Republic to the Russian Federation. This 
accomplishment is the culmination of years of planning, negotiations, and hard work. The United States, Russian 
Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been working together on the Russian Research Reactor 
Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program in support of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In February 2003, RRRFR 
Program representatives met with the Nuclear Research Institute in ?ež, Czech Republic, and discussed the return of 
their high-enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation for reprocessing. Nearly 5 years later, the 
shipment was made. This paper discusses the planning, preparations, coordination, and cooperation required to make 
this important international shipment. 
Introduction and Program Background 
In December 1999, representatives from the United States, Russian Federation, and International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) began working on a program to return Soviet and Russian-supplied high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel, 
currently stored at foreign research reactors, to Russia. This effort is being funded under the Russian Research Reactor 
Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program. The RRRFR Program is a nuclear nonproliferation initiative for eliminating stockpiles 
of HEU nuclear materials by encouraging eligible countries to convert their research reactors from HEU to 
low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel upon availability, qualification, and licensing of suitable LEU fuel. 
In May 2004, the “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation for the Transfer of Russian-Produced Research Reactor Nuclear Fuel to the 
Russian Federation” was signed. This agreement provides legal authority for the RRRFR Program and establishes 
parameters whereby eligible countries may return fresh and spent HEU fuel assemblies and fissile materials to Russia. 
Czech Republic Project Background 
In February 2003, a team of technical representatives from the United States, Russian Federation, and IAEA 
conducted a fact-finding mission of the Nuclear Research 
Institute (NRI) in ?ež, Czech Republic, which is about 20 km 
north of Prague along the banks of the Vltava River (see 
Figure 1). The purpose of this mission was to discuss the 
RRRFR Program with NRI and to obtain preliminary 
information about the physical and mechanical state of their 
fresh and HEU spent nuclear fuel (SNF), their facilities, and 
their transportation capabilities and experiences. During this 
mission, NRI expressed a desire to participate in the RRRFR 
Program. 
NRI owns and operates a LVR-15 Russian-designed type 
research reactor (see Figure 2). The reactor is a light-water 
moderated and cooled tank nuclear reactor with forced cooling. 
A combined water-beryllium reflector is used. The reactor was 
placed in operation in 1957 and operated until 1974 when it was 
upgraded to 10 MWt and the fuel was changed to the IRT-2M configuration with 80 weight percent 235U. It then 
operated until the core was converted in 1996 to IRT-2M fuel with 36 weight percent 235U with three or four tubes. Plans 
exist for further reducing the enrichment of the core to 19.7 weight percent 235U fuel of the IRT-4M configuration. When 
the project began, NRI had 299 HEU SNF and 206 LEU SNF assemblies available for return to the Russian Federation. 
In 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) began negotiating NRI’s participation in the RRRFR Program. 
In March 2005, an umbrella contract was signed for NRI to perform all activities needed to prepare for transporting 
Figure 1. Nuclear Research Institute, ?ež.
2their HEU SNF to the Russian Federation. In May 2007, the contract 
was amended to include actual HEU SNF handling, transport, and 
disposition. 
Project Planning and Execution 
NRI was responsible for the entire project, including overall 
project management. DOE provides funding and oversight of NRI. 
The scope, cost, and schedule for activities were negotiated, and NRI 
issued task plans. DOE would authorize the work by issuing a task 
assignment that established the scope of work, deliverables, 
schedule, and a fixed price. 
NRI assigned a highly qualified senior technical person with 
extensive management experience to manage the project. 
The success of this project can be attributed to the excellent 
planning, scheduling, cost estimating, managing, and 
communications skills of the project manager. The project manager being fluent in Czech, Russian, Slovak, and English 
was a significant attribute. 
Successful completion of the NRI SNF shipping and disposition project required a significant amount of planning 
and coordination, including obtaining a new transportation cask system, preparing both shipping and receiving facilities, 
participation of four countries, and involvement of numerous organizations, regulatory agencies, and contractors. On 
December 8, 2007, the shipment was completed. This shipment was the largest shipment of HEU SNF from a Russian 
designed nuclear research reactor. 
Transportation Cask System 
To accommodate the need for a large-capacity cask 
system to haul HEU SNF in support of the RRRFR Program, 
the IAEA, funded by DOE, competitively bid and selected the 
ŠKODA VPVR/M cask by ŠKODA JS a.s. of Plze?, Czech 
Republic. A tripartite contract was negotiated and signed 
between IAEA, ŠKODA JS a.s., and NRI for the cask system. 
ŠKODA provided 10 VPVR/M casks and ancillary equipment 
and agreed to maintain and store the casks for 10 years (the 
life of the RRRFR Program). NRI took ownership of these 
casks in exchange for allowing DOE to use the six casks they 
procured for hauling their LEU SNF. The IAEA, with support 
from DOE, performed quality audits and inspections of 
ŠKODA to ensure that regulatory requirements and design and 
fabrication specifications in the contract were satisfied. 
The VPVR/M cask (see Figure 3) has a unique top or 
bottom loading/unloading design. The cask consists of a 
massive, cast steel, cylindrical body that is 300-mm (12-in.) 
thick. The upper and lower parts of the body are tapered to 
minimize the total cask weight, which is needed to better 
accommodate the limited overhead crane capacities in the 
research reactor facilities. The cask’s external dimensions are 
1,505 mm (59-in.) high (without shock absorbers) by 
1,200-mm (47-in.) diameter. Its cavity is 885-mm (35-in.) 
high by 600-mm (24-in.) diameter. Internal cask walls have a 
hot aluminium spray coating for cask internal 
decontamination. The cask SNF basket is made of Atabor 
(i.e., 1.5% boron-treated) steel sheets that are 3.63-mm 
(0.14-in.) thick. The basket is 833-mm (33-in.) high by 
553-mm (22-in.) wide and has a 36-square port for the fuel 
assemblies. A central suspension/hanger rod, running down 
the middle of the basket, is used to raise or lower the basket in 
and out of the cask. 
Figure 2. LVR-15 reactor at ?ež.
Figure 3. Schematic of the VPVR/M transport  
and storage cask. 
3Ancillary equipment for the VPVR/M cask system includes a basket alignment tool, cask manipulating frame, cask 
tiedown system, drying/leak-testing equipment, a cask lift fixture, fuel-handling tools, and specially designed and 
certified International Shipping Organization (ISO) containers. 
The VPVR/M cask is licensed in four countries (i.e., Czech Republic, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine). 
The State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) of the Czech Republic issued the original license (CZ/048/B(U)F-96 
[Revision 1]) for both transport and storage. The cask is licensed for transport by road, railway, river, and sea. It also is 
licensed to transport 10 fuel types and store three types of Russian-origin research reactors fuels. 
In January 2006, Rosatom issued certificate RUS/3065/B(U)F-96 for the VPVR/M cask. This cask is the first 
foreign cask to be licensed for multiple uses in the Russian Federation. Obtaining this license involved the efforts of 
numerous Russian companies and organizations, including Sosny R&D Company, a privately owned Russian company 
who coordinated the licensing effort in Russia; FSUE “VNIIEF,” a government company who performed safety analysis 
and confirmed the structural, thermal, leak tightness, radiation, and nuclear safety of the cask design under normal and 
hypothetical accident conditions; FSUE “IPPE,” a government company who provided safety analysis that 
demonstrated the radiation and nuclear safety for the cask design under normal and hypothetical accident transportation 
conditions; Mayak, a government company who uses and is responsible for the cask system in Russia; and Rosatom and 
Rostechnadzor, the Russian regulators who licensed the casks in Russia. The certificate is valid until January 23, 2009. 
Obtaining competent authority certification for transport of the VPVR/M cask through Slovakia and Ukraine was 
fairly simple because the design meets the IAEA TS-R-1 international transportation requirements and is already 
licensed by the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation. Both countries approved use of the cask within their 
territory without performing a detailed evaluation. 
The cask system was thoroughly demonstrated at the SKODA JS a.s. 
manufacturing facilities in Plzen, Czech Republic; the NRI facilities at ?ež; 
and the Mayak facilities in Ozyorsk, Russia. Improvements, deficiencies, 
and lessons learned from those demonstrations were incorporated into the 
cask design and operations.1
Cask-handling operations resulted in several improvements being 
identified. The first was with the cask tiedown systems. During rail 
transport of the empty cask from the Czech Republic to the Mayak facility 
for the dry run, the tiedown turnbuckles loosened, allowing the casks to 
undergo fairly rapid, vibration-induced wear on the trunnions as shown in 
Figure 4. The tiedown system was redesigned to alleviate this problem. 
The second improvement involved damage caused to one of the cask 
lids at Mayak. During reassembly of VPVR/M Cask Number 012 (after 
being decontaminated at Mayak, Russia), the outer bottom lid was damaged. 
One of the two lid guide pins screwed into the cask body bolt holes was suck 
and could not be unscrewed during reassembly of the lid to the cask body. 
After the lid was guided into position on the cask, one of the pins was 
removed easily by hand. However, the other guide pin was stuck and could 
not be removed. Several attempts were made to remove the pin; however, 
efforts were unsuccessful. Finally, Mayak operators tried to remove the lid 
from the cask body using a hand-operated chain winch and overhead crane. 
The stuck guide pin caused the lid to tilt, which resulted in the guide pin 
breaking and the outer rim of the lid being deformed; this caused a bulge on 
the side of the lid (see Figure 5). The outer, first three bolt-hole threads in the 
cask body also were damaged. A root cause analysis was performed, the lid and cask bolt hole threads were repaired, 
and actions were taken to prevent reoccurrence of the 
problem. 
The third improvement involved spacer plates at 
the bottom of the cask baskets. During the receipt and 
maintenance inspection of the 16 VPVR/M casks at 
NRI after being returned from Mayak, three baskets 
had deformed fuel assembly ports and one basket had 
the spacer plates at the bottom of the baskets were 
broken off (see Figure 6). A root cause analysis was 
performed, the baskets were repaired, and actions were 
taken to prevent reoccurrence of the problem. 
Figure 4. Cask trunnion wear, resulting 
from loosening of the tiedown system 
during transport. 
Figure 5. Damaged VPVR/M cask lid.
Figure 6. Photographs showing the broken spacer and the 
bottom of the cask basket where the spacer was attached.
4Nuclear Research Institute Preparations/Operations 
NRI had three spent fuel storage facilities that needed to be prepared for fuel and cask-handling operations. Those 
facilities are the At Reactor Pool (ARP), the Reactor Annex Pool (RAP), and the Away from Reactor (AFR) or 
High-Level Waste Storage Facility 
(HLWSF).2
ARP and RAP are both located 
within the research reactor 
building. ARP is connected to the 
research reactor vessel inside the 
main reactor building (see 
Figure 7), whereas RAP is located 
in a room connected to the main 
reactor building, which is 
accessible by a special rail system 
(see Figure 8). 
Preparations for handling fuel 
assemblies and the cask in both 
storage pool areas involved 
overhead crane upgrades (adding a nomadic load cell and speed controls); setting up the ŠKODA VPVR/M cask 
manipulation frame; installing specially designed cask basket support in the RAP; modifying the AFR pool cask 
transport device; adding special shielding around the cask pool and support/fuel loading stand; setting up numerous 
specialized tools and equipment for handling the fuel and transport cask; and setting up cask drying and leak tightness 
testing equipment. 
The HLWSF (see Figure 9) is located on a hill overlooking the main NRI 
complex. Preparing HLWSF for fuel and cask-handling operations involved 
upgrading the overhead crane (adding a nomadic load cell and speed 
controls), setting up a specially designed cask manipulation frame, installing a 
cask-loading support bridge over the storage pool. Miscellaneous tools and 
equipment, including a cask drying and leak tightness testing machine, were 
installed. 
NRI made two major facility modifications to HLWSF that were not 
funded by DOE. A state-of-the-art, semiportable, modular hot cell was 
installed with specially designed remote-handling cutting and welding 
equipment and a cask basket-loading and storing system. The hot cell was 
used to repackage and load the EK-10 LEU SNF assemblies and the damaged 
IRT-2M fuel assemblies into specially designed stainless-steel canisters, 
which were hermetically sealed by being welded, loaded into a cask basket, and stored, pending loading into the casks. 
An extension was built onto the front of HLWSF for handling and storing the transport casks. A cask-transfer 
device on rails was installed in this extension (see Figure 10). A specially designed cask storage vault, used for storing 
both the loaded and empty VPVR/M casks, 
was installed on one side of the extension. 
This vault is designed to protect, isolate, and 
provide physical protection for the casks 
during storage at NRI (see Figure 11). 
Every NRI operation, procedure, new 
piece of equipment, and facility 
modification required special analysis and 
documentation. Examples include the 
following: (1) operations manual, 
(2) operation condition/limitation plan, 
(3) quality assurance manual, (4) emergency 
plan, (5) hot cell inspection and test plan, 
(6) permission for hot cell construction, 
(7) list of equipment to be controlled by 
SONS, (8) decommissioning plan, (9) list of 
controlled actions, (10) cask and SNF-handling operations procedures, and (11) safeguards and security plan, including 
Figure 7. LVR-15 reactor At Reactor 
Pool for spent nuclear fuel storage. 
Figure 8. The VPVR/M cask being moved 
into the Away from Reactor storage area. 
Figure 9. The High Level Waste 
Storage Facility. 
Figure 11. High-Level Waste Storage 
Facility extension cask storage vault. 
Figure 10. Specially designed cask-
transfer device on rails in the High-
Level Waste Storage Facility entrance 
hall.
5the IAEA design information questionnaire. Many of these documents were used to obtain facilities and operations 
licenses.
NRI conducted two demonstrations that tested the procedures, operations, equipment, and facility modifications. 
One demonstration used dummy fuel assemblies and the second demonstration used real HEU SNF assemblies. 
Both demonstrations confirmed NRI’s preparedness, provided training for the operators, and were used to obtain 
approval from SONS for actual fuel and cask-handling and loading operations. 
NRI loaded the first cask with SNF in March 2007 to confirm adequacy for the VPVR/M shielding. All 16 casks 
were loaded and placed in the HLWSF extension cask storage vault by the end of August 2007. Cask-loading operations 
went smoothly with no significant problems. It took about 3 days to load, seal, and prepare each cask for shipment. 
The 16 loaded casks left ?ež for Russia on December 1, 2007. 
Russian Federation Preparations/Operations 
Russian Federation law requires that thorough planning, review, and evaluations of the environmental impacts of 
importing nuclear materials be performed. The evaluations must show that importation will have a positive impact on 
the environment. A formal process, called State Ecological Review, was performed. This process evaluates the impact of 
transporting nuclear material within the Russian territory, including identifying potential emergencies, consequences, 
and responses; nuclear and radiation risks and mitigation of the risks’ impact on the public and environment; anti-
terrorist planning and training; and reprocessing the SNF, stabilizing the high-level waste, and storing it in Russia for 
20 years or less. The law also requires that the total cost of performing Czech shipment activities in Russia be identified 
and a 30% surcharge be added to the project. The added funds were used for “Special Environmental Programs” that 
had a positive impact on the public and environment at Mayak and in the Chelyabinsk Region. 
Approval to make the shipment into the Russian Federation was 
obtained after completion of the following: (1) the Unified Project and 
Special Environmental Programs; (2) the State Ecological Review 
(3) the Foreign Trade Contract between Russia and Czech Republic; 
(4) the Russian transport and cask licenses; (5) the Transport 
Conditions Plan between the Czech, Slovak, Ukraine, and Russian 
governments; (6) Mayak preparations; and (7) the Russian Transport 
Decree. 
Preparing Mayak for the NRI shipment involved two facilities 
(i.e., Buildings 855 and 101A) and modifying a specially designed 
railcar. Mayak’s fuel reprocessing, high-level waste vitrification 
process, and waste storage systems already existed and did not need to 
be changed to handle the NRI fuels. 
Upon arrival at Mayak, the ISO containers, loaded with VPVR/M 
casks, were received by rail in Building 855 (a large rail/truck high-bay 
area with a heavy capacity overhead crane [see Figure 12]). The loaded 
casks were transferred to specially designed railcars and transported to 
Building 101A (a larger hot shop with remote operations capabilities 
for handling casks and SNF assemblies [see Figure 13]). Specialized 
remote-handling equipment and tools were used to handle the VPVR/M 
cask system and transfer the NRI SNF to a special basket on a 
modified, storage pool, fuel-handling cart. A high-pressure, 
heated-water, decontamination facility was used to clean the emptied 
cask baskets before reinstallation into the casks. 
Mayak prepared the following documents for receiving and 
handling the NRI shipment: (1) “Technical Description and Operation 
Manual for the ŠKODA VPVR/M Cask at Mayak;” (2) design 
drawings, sketches, and descriptions of special tools and equipment; 
(3) detailed operating procedures; and (4) safety analysis. 
Mayak successfully completed a “dry run” of the cask and 
fuel-handling operations from May 30 through June 2, 2006. Mayak 
received the Czech shipment December 8, 2007, and completed 
unloading of the shipment, storage of the SNF, decontamination and 
reassembly of the empty casks, and shipment of the empty casks back 
to NRI on April 13, 2008. 
Figure 12. Cask unloading from the 
International Shipping Organization 
container in Building 855.
Figure 13. Loaded VPVR/M cask basket 
being transferred into the Building 101A hot 
shop/pool area. 

7their weapons issue was resolved. Even though this issue had been worked out by both governments before the actual 
shipment, the customs agent had to be educated about and convinced of the legitimacy of the agreement. 
The second, incident occurred at the Ukraine/Russian boarder. One of the buffer cars had a car-to-car hitch that was 
damaged. One of the technical escorts on the train photographed the damage, which was not allowed by Ukraine 
security. The shipment was delayed several hours while Ukraine security resolved the issue. 
Information about the shipment, schedule, and routes were protected by law in all four countries. However, 
two television reports were identified during the shipment. The first was from a local television station that heard there 
were unusual activities at the M?šice u Prahy rail station and sent a reporter and camera crew to see what was going on. 
The television crew was prevented from entering the station area by security guards. The television station reported the 
incident that night and had an interview with a manager from SONS that confirmed that a shipment was being done 
safely and that Czech law prevented any detailed discussion until after the shipment arrived safely at its destination. 
The second incident was at the Czech/Slovakia boarder. A similar situation occurred. Both reports had minimal 
coverage and were viewed as being positive reports. 
IAEA dispatched a reporter, videographer, and photographer to document the shipment. Their information was 
released to the public after the shipment arrived at Mayak. They prepared a feature story, a photo essay, a video clip, and 
a radio clip, which are found on the IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/prague.html. The 
following is a list of some of the other press releases: 
CTK: Czech Nuclear Waste from ?ež Institute Sent to Russia
http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/index_view.php?id=286014
AP: Czechs Move Spent Nuclear Fuel to Russia
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/10/world/main3601009.shtml
REUTERS: Czechs Return 80 kg of Enriched Uranium to Russia
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/theworld/2007/
December/theworld_December364.xml&section=theworld&col=
CBS: Agents Locking Down Loose Nuke Material
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/10/eveningnews/main3603231.shtml
DPA: Czech Spent Nuclear Fuel Used in Research Shipped to Russia
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/europe/news/article_1379953.php/Czech
spent_nuclear_fuel_used_in_research_shipped_to_Russia
WNN: ?ež Research Reactor Fuel Returned to Russia
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/explorationNuclearFuel/
Rez_research_reactor_fuel_returned_to_Russia-101207.shtml.
Shipment Approvals 
Obtaining numerous government agreements and approvals were required to ship the NRI material. This proved 
challenging at times because the project manager was not able to dictate the governments schedules. Table 1 identifies 
major agreements, contracts, and licenses that were needed to obtain approval for making the shipment. Participating 
governments for each activity are marked by an “X.” All approvals were received by the end of November 2007 and the 
shipment was completed by the end of 2007. 
Table 1. List of activities needing finalized before making the Nuclear Research Institute shipment. 
Activity 
U.S. 
DOE
Czech
Republic 
Russian
Federation Slovakia Ukraine Euratom 
U.S.-Russian Federation GTRI Agreement X X
NRI-DOE (NNSA) Contract X X     
Czech Republic-U.S. Diplomatic Note 
Exchange X X     
Czech Republic-U.S. Implementing 
Agreement X X     
Government-to-Government Agreement  X X    
Government-to-Government Transport 
Agreement  X X X X  
Table 1. (continued). 
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Activity 
U.S. 
DOE
Czech
Republic 
Russian
Federation Slovakia Ukraine Euratom 
NRI-Mayak Unified Project Contract  X X    
Transportation Technical Conditions Plan  X X X X  
NRI-Russian (TENEX) Foreign Trade 
Contract  X X   X 
Package/Cask Design License  X X X X  
Country Transport License  X X X X  
Slovakia-Ukraine physical protection border 
exchange agreement    X X  
Ukraine-Russian Federation physical 
protection border exchange agreement   X X
Carrier Contracts  X X X X  
Nuclear Damage Liability Insurance  X X X X  
Czech Export License  X     
Russian Import License   X    
Russian Prime Minister Shipment Decree X
Czech letter to Russia government 
guaranteeing high-level waste return  X
Russian letter to Czech government 
guaranteeing nonproliferation of SNF  X
Shipping papers completed X X X X 
Shipment notification to Mayak 30 days before the shipment, Mayak is informed 
all documentation is complete 
Summary and Conclusions 
Preparing to transport the NRI SNF to Mayak for reprocessing and waste stabilization and storage required a 
significant amount of planning and coordination. Sixteen new VPVR/M transport/storage casks and ancillary equipment 
were obtained and licensed in four countries. Three NRI SNF storage pool facilities were prepared, tested, and used to 
load the 16 casks. Two facilities at Mayak were prepared and tested for handling the VPVR/M casks and NRI SNF. The 
cask system was thoroughly demonstrated at NRI and Mayak. All preparations were completed for transporting the 
loaded casks through the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. Once all of the final approvals 
were received, the shipment was completed successfully in December 2007. 
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